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1. Our interest here is in the relations between the syntactical predicate 
' is true' and the syntactical modal predicates such as ' _ _  is 
necessary', ' is possible', ' is contingent', and '  entails... '  
That there should be similarities between these predicates is not surprising 
since the modal predicates are so-called because they deal with what used 
to be known as 'modes' of truth. ' _ _  is necessary', for example, is 
synonymous with ' _ _  is necessarily true'. 
The alleged pre-analytic view of the correct use of the predicate ' 
is true' is that we may accept all instances of the schema 
(1.1) ' ' is true if and only if _ _ .  
It is well known that this naive view leads to antinomies, or contradic- 
tions. Restrictions against accepting all instances of (1.1) are necessary. 
In particular, certain self-referential sentences must not be allowed to 
occupy the place of the blank in schema (1.1). 
By a syntactical view of modality is meant a view which holds that 
modal statements should be formed by attaching modal predicates such 
as ' is necessary' to names of sentences. Non-syntactical views differ 
in that they allow modal statements to be formed by attaching operators 
such as 'It is necessary that' to sentences themselves. 
Although it has often been claimed that there are philosophical advan- 
tages to adopting a syntactical view of modality (e.g. [7]), there has not 
been much interest in the construction of formal theories to represent 
syntactical modal statements. However, given a formal theory designed 
to represent non-syntactical modal statements, such as one of the famil- 
iar Lewis systems, we can easily construct an analogous syntactical 
theory. Corresponding to the non-syntactical modal statements which 
would be represented as instances of the Lewis schema'[Zip ~ p' we have 
the instances of the schema 
(1.2) If  ' _ _ '  is necessary, then _ _ .  
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Modal schemata such as (1.2) can be taken as giving us rules for the 
correct use of the modal predicates. One of the main questions to be dealt 
with in this paper is whether schemata such as (1.2) are like schema (1.1) 
for the use of ' _ _  is true' in point of requiring restrictions against 
acceptance of certain self-referential instances. Since there are various 
formal modal theories, each providing us with different schemata, it is 
of course possible that some modal theories require restrictions while 
others do not. 
In Part 2 of this paper we shall offer a description of an ordinary lan- 
guage modal antinomy analogous to the antinomy of the Liar. In Part 3 
we shall describe a formal theory SM and certain extensions thereof in 
which modal antinomies could be represented if they existed. SM will 
have as theorems the syntactical counterparts of Lewis' $5. In Part 4 we 
shall outline a proof of the consistency of the relevant extensions of SM, 
thereby showing that there are no modal antinomies of the sort described 
in Part 2 for modal theories no stronger than Lewis' $5. 
In Part 5 we shall discuss certain results by Richard Montague which 
might easily be interpreted as implying the existence of a modal antinomy. 
In Part 6 we shall give an explanation of why Montague's results do not 
in fact imply the existence of a modal antinomy of the sort described in 
Part 2. 
2. The antinomy of the Liar is the best known of the antinomies resulting 
from unrestricted acceptance of the instances of schema (1.1). A particu- 
larly simple version of this antinomy may be stated as follows. 
(2.1) The Antinomy of the Liar. A contradiction follows from the 
acceptance of all instances of the schema 
(a) ' ' is true if and only if _ _  
together with the empirical identity statement 
(b) The 1st sentence on B is 'The 1st sentence on B is not true' 
(where 'B' is an abbreviation of a description which singles out a particu- 
lar blackboard at a particular time). 
The antinomy is easily demonstrated by taking as an instance of (a) 
(2.2) 'The 1 st sentence on B is not true' is true if and only if the 1st 
sentence on B is not true 
ON T H E  E X I S T E N C E  OF A M O D A L  A N T I N O M Y  465 
and making the identity substitution licensed by (b) to obtain 
(2.3) The 1st sentence on B is true if and only if the 1st sentence 
on B is not true. 
We shall take the following as our description of an ordinary language 
modal antinomy analogous to the antinomy of the Liar. 
(2.4) The syntactical theory of modality S has a modal antinomy = a .  
There could be a set of modal statements upon the blackboard B such that 
a contradiction could be inferred from instances of theorems of S together 
with the identity statements generated by the placement of sentences on B. 
By a modal statement in (2.4) is meant a statement all of whose pre- 
dicates are modal predicates. 
The identity statements mentioned in (2.4) will be statements of the 
form 'The nth sentence on B is . . . . .  where the sentence which fills 
the blank is in fact the nth sentence on B. A particular configuration of 
chalk upon B might yield the following identity statements. 
(2.5) The 1st sentence on B is 'The 2nd and 3rd sentences on B are 
necessary' 
The 2nd sentence on B is 'The 2nd sentence on B entails the 
negation of the 1st sentence on B' 
The 3rd sentence on B is 'The 3rd sentence on B is not neces- 
sary'. 
We allow B to contain more than one sentence because we wish to 
allow for the possibility of a modal antinomy involving indirect self- 
reference, as well as for the possibility of one involving only direct self- 
reference. We say that a sentence is directly self-referential if it contains 
singular terms referring to itself and that it is indirectly self-referential 
if it contains only singular terms referring to other sentences which even- 
tually refer back to the original sentence. 
There is a well known antinomy involving ' _ _  is true' which uses 
only indirect self-reference. This antinomy consists of a pair of sentences, 
the first of which asserts the truth of the second and the second of which 
denies the truth of the first. 
3. The language for our theory SM is formed by adding the single 
quotation mark ' ' 'to an ordinary first-order language with identity. It 
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will be convenient to suppose that this language has negation, disjunction, 
and existential quantification as primitive operations. 
Since the single quotation mark is to simulate the behavior of quotation 
marks in English we adopt the formation rule 
(3.1) If  A is a sentence, then r'A'n is a term. 
To preserve the referential opacity of quotation marks we stipulate 
that those occurrences of terms which are proper parts of terms of the 
form r'A'n are bound occurrences. This stipulation will prevent identity 
substitutions within quoted expressions and also quantification into quo- 
ted expressions. 
SM contains the following non-logical symbols. 
(3.2) Constants: 'a', 'b', 'c', 'al', ... 
A one-place predicate symbol: 'N'  
A one-place function symbol: "neg' 
A two-place function symbol: 'dis' 
'N'  is to represent ' _ _  is necessary'. 'neg' and 'dis' allow us to talk 
about negations and disjunctions of sentences, and hence of all truth- 
functions. We can define the other modal predicates in terms of 'N'. For 
example, we may use 'P '  to represent ' is possible' and 'E' to repre- 
sent ' . _ _  entails ...'. introducing these letters into our theory by way 
of the definitions 
(3.3) (x) (P(x)  -=- ,,o N(neg(x))) 
(x) (y)  (E(x ,  y) =- N(dis(neg(x), y))) 
All instances of the following schemata, where A and B are sentences, 
are non-logical axioms o f  SM. 
(3.4) (a) N('A') = A 
(b) N ( ' A  m B') = (N('A') = N('B')) 
(c) ,,, N('A') = N(',-~ N('A')') 
(d) neg( 'A')= 'NA'  
(e) dis('A', 'B') = 'A v B' 
(f) 'A' ¢ 'B', where A and B are different sentences. 
SM allows the following inference. 
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(3.5) From a sentence A to infer r-N('A')7, provided that the sequence 
of expressions up to and including A is such that the result of deleting 
some number, possibly zero, of these expressions is a proof of A in 
SM. 
The first three axioms of (3.4) together with the inference (3.5) are the 
syntactical analogues of a common axiomatization of Lewis' $5. 
An I-extension of SM is a theory which results from SM by the addition 
of a finite number of non-logical axioms of the form r-a~ = 'A~ '7, where 
each a~ is a distinct constant and each A~ is a sentence, although not 
necessarily distinct. These non-logical axioms are known as the theory's 
I-axioms. 
I-axioms are intended as representations of the identity statements 
generated by the arrangement of sentences on the blackboard B,-as 
described in Part 2. Corresponding to the identity statements in (2.5), for 
example, we have the I-extension whose I-axioms are 
(3.6) a = 'N(b) & N(c)' 
b = 'N(dis(neg(b), neg(a)))' 
c = ' NN(c)' 
The cumbersome statement of the inference (3.5) is to prevent the 
application of the necessitation rule to I-axioms and expressions which 
depend on I-axioms. That the nth sentence on B should be such-and-such 
is a contingent and not a necessary fact. 
In the next part we shall outline a proof of the consistency of every I-ex- 
tension of SM. This will show that there is no modal antinomy of the 
sort described in Part 2 for syntactical modal theories no more powerful 
than $5. 
To illustrate the expressive power of SM we compare it to a similar 
theory ST intended as a formalization of a syntactical theory of truth. 
ST is like SM except for containing the one-place predicate symbol 'T' in 
place of 'N' and the instances of the single schema rT('A') - A 7 ill place 
of the instances of the first three schemata of (3.4). ST omits the inference 
(3.5). 
It is easy to show that the I-extensions of ST are not all consistent. 
Corresponding to the antinomy of the Liar is the I-extension whose only 
I-axiom is 'a = ' -  T(a)". A simple proof shows this theory to be incon- 
sistent. 
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(3.7) (1) a = ' ~  T(a)' I-axiom 
(2) T ( ' ~  T(a)')  = ~ T(a) axiom 
(3) T(a) = ,., T(a) 1, 2 
Corresponding to the antinomy in which a first sentence asserts the 
truth of a second while the second denies the truth of the first is the in- 
consistent I-extension of ST whose I-axioms are 'a = 'T(b)" and 'b = 
= ' ~  T (a )" .  
(3.8) (1) a = 'T(b) '  I-axiom 
(2) b = ' ~ T ( a ) '  I-axiom 
(3) T( 'T(b) ' )  = T(b) axiom 
(4) T(a) = T(b) 1, 3 
(5) T(a) = T ( ' ~  T(a)')  2, 4 
(6) T(',.~ T(a)')  = ,~ T(a) axiom 
(7) T(a) = ,~ T(a) 5, 6 
In discussing self-referential sentences Kaplan and Montague state the 
following ([2], p. 82), where their rS;7, the standard name of S, can be 
identified with the r ' s ' 7  of SM. 
... whenever we are given a formula F whose sole free variable is 'x ' ,  we can find a 
sentence S which is provably equivalent to F(~¢), that  is, the result of replacing in F 
the variable 'x '  by the standard name of S. The sentence F(~q) makes a certain assertion 
about the sentence S. Since S is provably equivalent to F(~) ,  S makes the same assertion 
about  S, and thus is self-referential. Besides this method and its variants, no other 
precise ways of treating self-referential sentences are known to us. 
All self-referential sentences of the sort described above are representable 
in I-extensions of SM. Let F(x)  be a formula of SM with 'x' as its only 
free variable. Consider the I-extension of SM which contains ra  = F(a) n 
as an I-axiom. In this theory we have rF(a) = F('F(a) ' )  n as a theorem. 
Thus letting S be rF(a)n with its standard name r 'F(a) '-1 we have the 
provable equivalence r s  - F( 'S ' )  7. 
4. A detailed proof of the consistency of every I-extension of SM is given 
in [5], Sections 8-12. Here we present only a description of the method 
used. The proof is by way of a syntactic reduction procedure which is an 
adaptation of the method of proof used in 'tree systems'. 1 A 'tree' may 
be defined as a set of points for which the following conditions hold. 
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There is an integer assigned to each point, this integer being the 'level' 
of  the point. There is exactly one point at level one, this point being the 
'base' of  the tree. Each point is connected only to point(s) at the next 
higher or next lower level. Every point other than the base is connected 
to exactly one point at the next lower level and each point is connected 
to at most two other points at the next higher level. Points which are not 
connected to any points at the next higher level are 'terminal' points. 
A tree for an expression E is a tree which has an expression at every 
point, E being the expression at the base of the tree. 
Expressions which either contain an expression and its negation as 
disjuncts or else contain a disjunct of the form r 'A'  ~ 'B '7, where A and 
B are different sentences, are 'tree axioms', 
A set of 15 schematic rules is introduced (a slight simplification of the 
rules in [5]). The upper lines are the premises of the rules and the lower 
lines are their conclusions. The order of  the disjuncts in an expression is 
considered immaterial. 
In the statement of the rules P, Q, and R are expressions (Q perhaps 
being void), A and B are sentences, t and u are terms, and v is a variable. 
P(t/u) results from P be replacing at most one free occurrence of t in P by 
u, the new occurrence of u being free. P(t//u) results from P by replacing 
all free occurrences of t in P by u, the new occurrences of u again being 
free. 
(4.1) (1) e v g 
~ ~ P v  Q 
(2) ~ P v  a ~ R v  O 
,,~(Pv R) v Q 
(3) ~P(v//v*) v Q where v* is a variable which has no 
~ (Ev) P v Q free occurrences in the conclusion 
(4) (Ev) P v P(v//t) v Q 
(Ev) P v a 
(5) P v t ~ t  
P 
( 6 )  t u v P(t/u) 
t ~ u v P  
(7) u # t v Q  
t ~ u v Q  
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(8) a = a v  Q 
N('A') v Q 
(9) a ¢ a v Q  
N('A') v Q 
(10) a ~ a v Q  
N N('A') v Q 
(11) a =  a v Q 
N N('A') v a 
(12) P(neg('A')/'NA') 
P 
(13) e(disj( 'A' ,  'B')/ 'A v B') 
P 
(14) NN(t)  v NN(t)  V Q 
,,,N(t) v a 
(15) N(Ev) P v N(ev) e v Q 
,,~(Ev) P v Q 
if  A has a closed tree 
if A does not have a dosed tree 
if A has a dosed tree 
if A does not have a closed tree 
An expression is said to have a 'closed' tree if there is a tree for that 
expression which contains only a finite number of  points, and which has 
a tree axiom at every terminal point, and every expression in the tree is 
related to the expression(s) to which it is connected at the next higher 
level as conclusion to premise(s) of  one of the 15 rules in (4.1). 
Let SM* be an arbitrary I-extension of SM with I-axioms ra  1 = 
=,A1,-1,..., r a =  ,,~.~,,7 and let ' I '  abrreviate the disjunction ra  1 
'AI '  v ... v an ~ 'An '-~. To prove the consistency of  SM* it is sufficient 
to establish the following two claims. 
(4.2) I f  P is a theorem of  SM*, then there is a closed tree for 
r l v  pn.  
(4.3) There is no closed tree for r l  v a ¢ a 7. 
The proof  of  (4.2) requires the specification of  a set of logical axioms 
for SM. A standard set of such axioms is used in [5]. Both of  the above 
claims are then proven by rather tedious inductions. 
It  should be pointed out that the use of  the tree systems is strictly an 
ad hoc device for proving the consistency of  SM*. The property of having 
closed trees does not tell us anything of an interesting philosophical 
nature about the expressions of  SM for there are many non-theorems of  
SM which have closed trees. 
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5. We shall begin by stating two theorems. The first is a well known 
theorem usually referred to as Tarski's Theorem. The second is proven 
by Montague ([4], pp. 156--8). 
(5.t) Tarski's Theorem. If T is a theory which 
(a) contains Q (or a relativization theoreof) as a subtheory 
and also contains a one-place predicate True(x) such that for any sentence 
A o f T  
(b) t- True(nr(A)) - A 
then T is inconsistent. 
(5.2) Montague's Theorem. If T is a theory which 
(a) contains Q (or a relativization thereof) as a subtheory 
and also contains a one-pl ace predicate Nec(x) such that for any senten- 
ces A, B of T 
(b) I- Nec(nr(A)) = A 
(c) ~- Nec(nr(Nec(nr(A)) = A)) 
(d) ~- Nec(nr(A ~ B)) = (Nec(nr(A)) = Nec(nr(B))) 
(e) F- Nec(nr(A)), if A is a valid sentence of first-order logic 
then T is inconsistent. 
Q is a subtheory of Peano arithmetic often referred to as Robinson's 
Arithmetic. Q has the property of being finitely axiomatizable but yet 
sufficient for the representation of all recursive functions. A relativization 
of Q is Q with a one-place predicate in the places appropriate for inter- 
pretation as ' . _ _ _  is a number' (for details of Q see [9], pp. 51ft.). 
'nr (A)' refers to the numeral of Twhich, on the standard interpretation, 
denotes the G~del number of A under a suitable GSdel numbering. It 
should be noted that schemata (b), (c) and (d) of Montague's Theorem 
are syntactical analogues, with 'nr(A)' in the place of SM's "A", of 
theorem schemata of Lewis' weakest system S1. 
Tarski's Theorem can be said to be a formal representation of the 
antinomy of the Liar as set out in (2.1) in the sense that we can recover 
that antinomy by 'translating' a standard proof of Tarski's Theorem back 
into ordinary language. This proof involves the construction of a sentence 
A such that t-True(nr(,~A))- A. The sentence A 'says' that its own 
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negation is true, or equivalently, that it itself is not true, which is just  
what the first sentence on B in (2.1) seemed to be saying. 
Since Montague's  Theorem makes a point with respect to a predicate 
to be interpreted as ' _ _  is necessary' which is similar to the point 
which Tarski 's  Theorem makes for a predicate to be interpreted a s '  
is true',  an obvious thought is that we should be able to ' translate'  the 
p roof  of  Montague's  Theorem back into ordinary language to obtain 
some sort of  modal antinomy analogous to the Liar. Indeed Montague 
does feel that  this theorem has less than pleasant consequences for the 
advocate of  a syntactical view of modality. 
Thus if necessity is to be treated syntactically, that is, as a predicate of sentences, as 
Carnap and Quine have urged, then virtually all of modal logic, even the weak system 
S1, must be sacrificed. 
This is not to say that the Lewis systems have no natural interpretation. Indeed, if 
necessity is regarded as a sentential operator, then perfectly natural model-theoretic 
interpretations may be found ... which satisfy all the Lewis systems S1-$5. 
... It seems at present doubtful that any philosophical interest can be attached to 
S1-$4. The natural model-theoretic treatment gives a system stronger than all of them, 
and no satisfactory syntactical treatment can be given for any of them. ([4], p. 161) 
In  [2] Kaplan  and Montague argue that the effect of  a theorem similar to 
Montague's  Theorem for syntactical treatments of  epistemic modality 
is to show that some technique such as stratification into different levels 
of  language, a popular way of avoiding the antinomies surrounding 
' is true', must also be adopted in formal treatments of  syntactical 
epistemic modalities, z By his claim that there can be no satisfactory 
syntactical theories analogous to the Lewis systems Montague presumably 
means that  there can be no such theories which do not adopt  a device 
like stratification into language levels. 8 
An obvious difference between the theories shown to be inconsistent 
by Montague's  Theorem and theories such as SM lies in the method used 
for forming names of  sentences. The theories meeting the antecedent 
conditions of  Montague 's  Theorem use GSdel numbers as names of  
sentences while SM forms such names by enclosing sentences in single 
quotation marks. Montague is, however, quite clearly committed to the 
view that his theorem does have consequences for theories which form 
names of sentences in the manner of  SM. 
... we suppose syntax to be arithmetized and use as syntax languages those languages 
which contain the symbols of arithmetic .... ([4l, p. 158) 
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We can associate with each expression a term of Q which can be regarded as the 
standard name of that expression; to be specific we associate with the expression s 
the name ['nr(s)'] .... ([4], p. 156) 
This approach is by no means essential, and is adopted only to allow us to build on 
terminology and results already present in the literature. An equivalent and perhaps 
more natural approach would employ a syntax language ... which speaks directly 
about expressions. ([4], p. 158n) 
It is ... desirable to introduce a system of names of expressions. Thus if E is any 
expression, E is to be the s t a n d a r d  n a m e  of E, constructed according to one of several 
alternative conventions. We might, for instance, construe E as the result of enclosing E 
in quotes. Within technical literature a more common practice is to identify E with 
the numeral corresponding to the G~del-number of E. As a third alternative, we could 
regard E as the structural-descriptive name of E (within some well-determined meta- 
mathematical theory). A foundation for our later arguments could be erected on the 
basis of any one of these conventions. ([2], p. 80) 
By 'structural-descriptive names '  Montague  is referring to a system of  
naming in which the name of  a c o m p o u n d  expression is a concatenate  o f  
the names o f  the symbols in the expression. I f ' c ee ' ,  'aye ' ,  and ' tee '  named  
'c ' ,  'a ' ,  and ' t ' ,  respectively, and  '* '  represented the concatenat ion func- 
tion, then the structural-descriptive name of  'cat '  would  be 'cee*aye*tee'.  
I t  is well known that  concatenat ion theories are as powerful as arith- 
metic theories (see [3], [6]), so we have no reason to question Montague ' s  
claim that  results obtainable by the use o f  GSdel numbers  are also 
obtainable by the use o f  structural-descriptive names. Our  interest is in 
the claim that  results obtainable by the use o f  G/Sdel numbers  are also 
obtainable by the use o f  quotat ion mark  names. 
6. Montague ' s  claim is that  there can be no satisfactory (unstratified), 
consistent syntactical modal  theory which forms names o f  expressions 
by enclosing them in quota t ion marks and which contains the analogues 
o f  the theorems of  $1. There is an apparent  conflict between this claim 
and the fact that  SM is a consistent, unstratified syntactical theory which 
forms names with quotat ion marks and contains as theorems the anal- 
ogues o f  the even stronger Lewis system $5. 
In  the case o f  Tarski 's  Theorem we saw that  a s tandard p r o o f  o f  tha t  
theorem involved the construct ion o f  a sentence A such that  ~-True 
(n r (~A) )  = A. Since A could be taken as 'saying'  that  it is itself was no t  
true, it was easy to construct  the analogue of  A in a theory which used 
quota t ion  mark  names. This was done for  ST in (3.7). 
W h e n  we look at the p roo f  o f  Montague ' s  Theorem we see that  it 
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involves the construction of  a sentence B such that ~- Nec(nr (S = ,-~B)) -- 
= B, where S is a conjunction of  the finite axioms of Q. Thus the finite 
axiomatizability of the arithmetic subtheory seems to be essential to the 
proof  of Montague's Theorem while it is not essential to the proof  of  
Tarski's Theorem. If  we are to reconstruct the sentence B either in 
ordinarylanguage or in SM, we must find some analogue for the axioms of Q. 
Since self-reference canbe achievedvia a GSdel numbering, a first thought 
is that the axioms of Q might function simply as a device for effecting 
self-reference. Self-reference is effected in SM by the use of I-axioms, so 
perhaps some set of  I-axioms might correspond to the axioms of  Q. The 
attractiveness of this line of thought increases when it is noted that the 
proof  of  Montague's Theorem does not assume that the axioms of Q are 
necessary. This parallels SM's restriction against applying the necessita- 
tion rule to I-axioms. But, as it turns out, every I-extension of SM is 
consistent so the axioms of  Q must serve a purpose which can not be 
captured by I-axioms. 
It  is emphasized in both [2] and [4] that an arithmetic subtheory may 
serve as a syntax language, that is, as a language in which certain syn- 
tactical truths may be expressed. 
By elementary syntax we understand a first-order theory containing ... all standard 
names (of expressions), means for expressing syntactical relations between, and opera- 
tions on, expressions, and appropriate axioms involving these notions. The form of 
such a theory will of course depend on the convention adopted for the assignment of 
standard names. If the [use of G5del numbers] is adopted, we could identify elementary 
syntax with Peano's arithmetic ... or even with the much weaker theory Q ... in either 
case, however, supplemented by the special formulas mentioned above. ([2], p. 89n) 
Montague would presumably say that the reason his theorem does not  
imply the inconsistency of  SM is that SM does not contain enough 
syntax. The same criticism applied to our characterization of a modal 
antinomy in Part 2 would be that our notion of a modal antinomy was 
too narrow. There we were trying to see if a contradiction could be 
inferred from certain identity statements and instances of modal schemata. 
What we should have done is to see if a contradiction could be inferred 
from the identity statements, the instances of  the modal schemata, and 
certain syntactical truths. 
It  is true that SM can not express a great deal of syntax. The provable 
syntactical truths are limited to statements of the identity and non- 
identity of  sentences and to statements to the effect that truth-functional 
ON THE E X I S T E N C E  OF A M O D A L  A N T I N O M Y  475 
compounds are or are not compounds of such-and-such components. 
Suppose, for example, that SM were extended by allowing the single 
quotation mark to form terms from all expressions, instead of just from 
sentences, and suppose that a function symbol 'diag' were introduced to 
represent the diagonalization function on predicates. We might then take 
as'D-axioms' all true diagonalizations such as 'diag('N(x)') = 'N('N(x)')". 
Extending SM by D-axioms would certainly increase the amount of 
expressible syntax, but it is far from clear that such an extension would 
be inconsistent. What is required for an analogue of Montague's Theorem 
to hold for an extension of SM is not just that a good deal of syntax be 
expressible in it, but also that this syntax be finitely axiomatizable. 
The possibility of a finite axiomatization of the syntax of a theory 
which forms names by means of quotation marks is dim. Such a theory 
will have an infinite number of names of expressions and, given our 
conventions on the referential opacity of quoted expressions, each of 
these names will be an irreducible surd. There seems to be no single 
sentence, for example, which would yield all D-axioms as deductive 
consequences within the theory. Quotation mark names thus are quite 
different from numerals and structural-descriptive names in that the 
latter are referentially transparent and are constructed by performing 
a finite number of operations on a finite number of initial symbols. 
Since we form names of expressions in ordinary language by enclosing 
them in quotation marks it may appear that we are committed to the 
view that the syntax of ordinary language is not finitely axiomatizable. 
This seems to raise a problem as to how we could ever learn the syntax 
of a language like English. Actually we are committed to no such view. 
For when we are speaking in English about English syntax we simply 
ignore the referential opacity of quoted expressions and in effect treat 
them as structural-descriptive names. 
The antinomy of the Liar shows that the artifice of treating quotation 
mark names as referentially opaque surds is not sufficient to prevent the 
antinomies surrounding the truth predicate. We must resort to additional 
techniques such as stratification into language levels. With the modal 
predicates, however, respect for the referential opacity of quoted expres- 
sions can be a sufficient safeguard against contradiction. 
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NOTES 
I The basic principles of tree systems can be traced back to Herbrand, Gentzen, and 
Beth. The system most like that used in [5] is that of [1]. Further references can be 
found in [8]. 
The systems mentioned above are designed for the first-order functional calculus, 
although usually not with identity. The adaptation to a syntactical theory of modality 
is an obvious adaptation but is probably original to [5]. 
2 Kaplan and Montagne [2] shows that a syntactical theory of epistemie modality 
which meets certain conditions is inconsistent. These conditions on a predicate re- 
presenting ' _ _  knows ' . . . "  are different from the conditions for the predicate 
Nee(x) in Montague's Theorem. 
However, we shall take remarks made in the earlier [2] as expressing the views of 
the Montague of [4], since the philosophical portions of the two papers seem to be 
the same and are often stated in more detail in the earlier paper. 
A stratified SM would replace the single predicate symbol 'N'  by an infinite number 
of predicate symbols 'NI', "N2',... and specify that r'N~('A')n, i 1> 1, was a well-formed 
expression just in case A was a sentence containing only occurrences of r-N~7 for ] < i. 
